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NOTES
tegral part test, which the Tenth Circuit enunciated in that decision. The case
fails to provide any precise definition of "integral part." Therefore, the decision
fails to provide any real guidance for future courts or for future litigants. Fur-
thermore, there is a strong federal policy that Congress has the power to pre-
scribe rules for federal courts and that such rules should be uniform. Using
the integral-part test, as the court did in Chappell, seems to go against this
policy. In some cases rule 3 would apply, while in others it would not.
Finally, it can be seen that to be safe plaintiffs in diversity suits should follow
the state commencement procedure as closely as possible. By so doing they can
protect themselves from possible dismissal of their cause of action because of
confusion over whether rule 3 or the state commencement statute is applicable
for tolling purposes. Until the Supreme Court agrees to hear a case such as
Chappell, the confusion surrounding the applicability of rule 3 will continue.
Questions such as the vitality of the Ragan decision and the applicability of
rule 3 for the purposes of tolling a state statute of limitations must ultimately
be answered by the Court. Until that time courts must struggle with the present
conflict in this area.
Donald H. Snell
Continued Use of Hanna v. Plumer as an Alternative to
Deciding the Constitutionality of State Foreign
Corporation Registration Laws
Avondale brought suit against Propulsion in a Louisiana state court. Propul-
sion demonstrated diversity of citizenship and removed the case to a federal
district court sitting in Louisiana. After removal of the case Propulsion asserted
a compulsory counterclaim pursuant to rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.1 Avondale then made a motion to dismiss Propulsion's
counterclaim, contending that Propulsion lacked the capacity to sue or bring
any judicial demand in Louisiana. Avondale's position was based on the
Louisiana statute that precludes a foreign corporation from asserting any ju-
dicial demand in Louisiana until such time as it has been duly authorized to
transact business in the state.! Held, motion to dismiss the counterclaim denied:
Pursuant to the holding in Hanna v. Plumer, rule 13 (a) prevails over an in-
consistent state foreign corporation statute when suit is removed to a federal
court sitting in diversity. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Propulsion Systems, Inc.,
53 F.R.D. 341 (E.D. La. 1971).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (a) provides in part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.2 LA. REv. STAT. § 12:314(A) (1969).
"380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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I. ERIE AND ITS PROGENY
The landmark decision of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins established the princi-
ple that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply both the case
and statutory law of the forum state with respect to substantive rights and
obligations.! In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,6 decided seven years after Erie,
the Supreme Court held that the choice between state or federal law was to be
based on an "outcome-determinative"' test, with state law being applied when-
ever failure to do so might produce a different result from that which would
be reached by a state court. By proclaiming this standard, the Court was seek-
ing to implement the uniformity of result commended by Erie.'
In Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.! the Court reaffirmed the principles in
Guaranty Trust and held that a federal court sitting in Mississippi must apply
a state law which denied access to the state courts to foreign corporations doing
business in that state without conforming with its registration requirements.'"
In an attempt to delineate the limits of the outcome-determinative test," the
Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc." limited the strict in-
terpretation given the test in Woods. In its place, the Court stated that a di-
versity court must ascertain whether there were any countervailing considera-
tions of federal policy sufficiently compelling to justify disregarding the state
rule." Thus, the notion that a federal court sitting in a diversity action is mere-
ly an extension of the state judicial system was put to rest.
In 1965, in Hanna v. Plumer,'4 the Court was for the first time presented
with the situation in which there was a direct conflict between a federal rule
and a state rule. There the plaintiff sued the executor of an estate in a Mas-
sachusetts federal district court to recover damages for personal injuries caused
by the defendant's decedent. Process was served by leaving a copy of the sum-
mons with the executor's wife at his residence. Under rule 4(d) such service
was valid notice of the action. But, under Massachusetts state law, such service
was not adequate. The Court resolved the conflict by proclaiming that Erie
was not the appropriate test of the validity and applicability of a federal rule."9
4304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'The determination of what rights and obligations are "substantive," as opposed to pro-
cedural, is of course a part of the problem discussed in this Note. See note 20 infra.
'326 U.S. 99 (1945).
'Id. at 109.
'Two years later in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), the Court was faced
with a North Carolina statute that prohibited suits for deficiency judgments on purchase
money mortgages. The Court held that the action brought in a North Carolina federal court
must be dismissed since the court was "in effect, only another court of the state." Id. at 187.
For a comprehensive study of the effect of this decision see Farinholt, Angel v. Bullington:
Twilight of Diversity Jurisdiction?, 26 N.C.L. REV. 29 (1947).
9337 U.S. 535 (1949).
"The opinion pointed out that Angel and Guaranty Trust provided the controlling
theory "that a right which local law creates but which it does not supply with a remedy is
no right at all for purpose of enforcement in a federal court in a diversity case; that where
in such case one is barred from recovery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in
the federal court." Id. at 538.
" This test has provoked widespread criticism among the writers. See Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 512 (1954).
"356 U.S. 525 (1958).
'Id. at 537-38.
14380 U.S. 460 (1965).
1" Id. at 469-70.
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The Court distinguished Woods as involving situations in which the federal
rule is not as broad as the losing party urged, and, there being no federal rule,
state law was made applicable by the Erie doctrine." Contrasting a situation in
which a "relatively unguided Erie choice"'" is present, the Court found the
command of the federal rules to be clear."8 The Court determined that the Erie
rule, and the guidelines set down in Guaranty Trust, were created to protect
the states' substantive regulation of the primary conduct and activity of its
citizens." Absent such a state purpose, the Court held itself compelled to
apply the federal rule in the face of congressional desire to bring about uni-
formity in the federal courts.0
II. OPENING THE DOORS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
Statutes governing the registration of foreign corporations have been enacted
in all fifty states." The penalties for non-compliance vary from the voiding of
all contracts'" to the restriction of access to the state's courts." A corporation
doing business within a state other than that of its incorporation must register
as a condition to its enjoyment of the substantive rights accorded the citizens
of the state.'" Present federal statutes provide that a corporation is a citizen
of both the state of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal
place of business.' In addition, a corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of any state in which it is "doing business."" In clarifying what
corporate actions constitute "doing business," the Supreme Court has stated
that certain minimum contacts create a relationship with the forum state to
such an extent that requiring a corporation to defend in an action brought in the




"The validity of this command is to be tested not by the Erie doctrine, but by the con-
stitutional power of Congress to prescribe federal rules and by the meaning of the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. 5 2072 (1971), through which Congress has exercised that
power. 380 U.S. at 472-74.
"1ld. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring). It has been suggested that a substantive rule is
one that influences the primary behavior of a citizen in his everyday life, while a procedural
rule affects only judicial housekeeping regulating the fair disposition of cases in court. See,
e.g., Note, Erie, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law in Diversity Cases, 53 VA. L.
REV. 380, 393-94 (1967); Note, Choice of Procedure in Diversity Cases, 75 YALE L.J.
477, 482-85 (1966).
"1380 U.S. at 471.
"See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 10-481 (1956); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §
157.102 (1953); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.570 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 23A.32
(1969).
"See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.93, 450.95 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
55 691, 764 (1958).
"3ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1953), 157.109 (1933), 157.125 (1949); TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.18 (1969). It has been suggested that the state purpose and
policy behind foreign corporation registration laws is a desire to force the out-of-state cor-
poration to admit, by registering, that it is in fact "doing business" within the state, thus
subjecting it to state taxation. Note, Diversity Jurisdiction: State Door-Closing Legislation
Under the Erie Doctrine, 66 COLtIM. L. REV. 377 (1966). A comprehensive study of the
tax factors involved is presented in Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: A Current Account,
47 N.C.L. REV. 733, 743 (1969).
' See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
"28 U.S.C. S 1332(c) (1971).
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27 1d. at 316.
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The Impact of Woods. The effect of the minimum contacts test has been to
subject a relatively small interstate corporation to heavy penalties through the
strict application of Woods." Such use of Woods in these situations has all
but financially ruined some corporations."0 It has been suggested that such re-
sults place an undue financial burden upon the economy of the nation as a
whole.' In the face of several shocking results, federal trial and appellate
judges in recent decisions have attempted to avoid the Woods decision and the
result that it necessarily demands. In 1953, a federal district court sitting in
Texas simply refused to follow Woods by saying that "it would be an unseem-
ly surrender of sovereignty for the federal judiciary to be ruled by state statutes
as to the right to enter a national court."" The Fifth Circuit, while not voicing
such a candid refusal, managed to find an exception to the Woods rule. The
Fifth Circuit held that foreign corporation statutes "will not be construed to
deal with suits on interstate transactions; and that if they are so construed,
they will not be upheld.""
Byrd and Countervailing Federal Policies. The expansion of the outcome-
determinative test in Woods met stiff qualification in the Byrd decision. Jus-
tice Brennan, acknowledging that the facts in Byrd probably were adapted to
the use of the outcome test, nevertheless formulated a new area of inquiry.'
The first step in determining the choice of law was to determine whether the
proposed state rule was bound up with the state-created rights and obligations
sought to be enforced. If not, the importance of the federal law to the uniform
administration of cases in the federal courts was to be weighed against the state
policy involved.' In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.' the Fourth Circuit for-
mulated a thoughtful guide for applying the standard of Byrd. In essence, this
guide provided that state provisions, whether substantive or procedural, must
be applied by the federal courts if sufficiently bound up with the substantive
right or obligation at issue; but, if a state procedural provision is not so bound
up, the federal court may disregard it in the face of affirmative countervailing
considerations." In finding that the state's reason "for enacting its 'door-closing'
statute was uncertain," the court found a clear countervailing federal consid-
eration: "the constitutional extension of subject-matter jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts in suits between citizens of different states."" It would seem that the
countervailing federal considerations needed to reject a state rule not affecting
substantive rights were made available by the Hanna Court's reliance on the
28 See, e.g., Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966); Kuchenig v.
California Co., 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965).
20 Hicks Body Co. v. Ward Body Works, 233 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1956). Here an Indiana
corporation was not allowed to sue an Arkansas corporation in an Arkansas federal court for
the alleged breach of a contract to manufacture 12,000 school buses.
"
0 See Note, A Critical Evaluation of State Foreign Corporation Laws As a Bar to Federal
Diversity jurisdiction, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 416, 428 (1970).
3"Emulsol Corp. v. Rubenstein & Son Produce, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 410, 411 (N.D. Tex.
1953).
"Waggener Paint Co. v. Paint Distrib., Inc., 228 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1955).
'Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
'Id. at 537-38.
"5 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
"I1d. at 63-64.
"Id. at 65. For a discussion of the Szantay case, see Note, supra note 23.
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federal rules as the necessary means to achieve uniform "housekeeping" in the
federal courts.
In Power City Communications, Inc. v. Calaveras Telephone Co.38 a federal
district court in California analyzed the state statute to determine the policies
behind its enactment. There the question was whether rule 17 (b), regarding
the capacity of a corporation to sue, was to control over conflicting California
law. In answering the question, the court determined that the state purpose
was to protect the public from actions brought by dishonest and incompetent
contractors. Weighing this state purpose against rule 17(b), the court deter-
mined that the substantive nature of the state law rendered the federal rule in-
applicable." It would seem that the court construed the state statute as being
sufficiently bound up with the substantive right or obligation at issue.'
III. AVONDALE SHIPYARDS, INC. V. PROPULSION SYSTEMS, INC.
Relying on Woods, the plaintiff in Avondale attempted to show the court
that Hanna, and its adherence to the purpose of the federal rules, was not in-
tended to control over regulations governing state public policy. The defendant,
however, attacked the state statute as one lacking the substantive nature re-
quired to cause the dictates of Woods to control.
In determining the purpose of the state statute, the court seems to have im-
plemented the test offered by Szantay.4' The court took a careful look at the
state policies underlying the California statute involved in the Power City de-
cision and distinguished them from the policies underlying the statute in the
case before it. The court distinguished the California statute from the Louisiana
statute in that under the latter a foreign corporation may at any time register
and subsequently be qualified to bring suit. The court further contrasted the
California rule as one affecting substantive rights of litigants with the Louisiana
rule which evidenced only a "conditional prohibition designed for 'housekeep-
ing' purposes."'0
The court went on to distinguish the purposes of rule 17(b) from those of
rule 13(a). Rule 17(b) concerning capacity was said to be based on entirely
different considerations from rule 13(a) which governs compulsory counter-
claims.4 Under rule 17(b) the capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued in
any federal court is to be determined by the law of the state of its incorpora-
tion. But Angel v. Bullington " qualified the federal rule by holding that
though the corporation may technically have capacity under rule 17(b), it
cannot recover when recovery would not be possible in the state court.' In
essence, the jurisdiction of the federal courts may not originally be invoked
if the corporation lacks the capacity to sue in the forum state. As a contrary
proposition, rule 13 (a) counterclaims are not presented until after jurisdiction
38280 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Cal. 1968); see Kennedy, Federal Civil Rule 17(b) and
(c): Qualifying To Litigate in Federal Court, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 273 (1968).
' 280 F. Supp. at 812.
40 See note 36 supra, and accompanying text.
41 Id.
"' 53 F.R.D. at 348.
4 Id. at 347.
See note 8 supra.
330 U.S. at 190.
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is demonstrated by the original claimant. At the time the counterclaim is as-
serted, the federal court has already obtained the necessary jurisdiction to in-
voke the power of the federal rules in governing procedural matters. While
rule 17(b) must bow to forum state substantive rights, the court considered
rule 13(a) as dominant over conflicting state law because of its inherently
procedural nature."
In using the blanket protection offered by Hanna, the court silently acknowl-
edged the fact that only when a state statute failed to meet the test of Byrd
and Szantay may it be disregarded in favor of the federal rules. Buttressing
its position that rule 13(a) must control, the court cited the Fourth Circuit
decision in Tolson v. Hodge." The Tolson court held that "once a district court
properly exercises jurisdiction to determine a cause of action, such procedural
matters as the assertion of counterclaims should be governed by the specific
Federal Rules pertaining thereto without further reference to state law."48
Apparently, the Avondale court is saying that because of the "housekeeping"
purpose of the Louisiana statute, it would not control over either rule 13(a)
or rule 17(b), thus making the Louisiana statute totally ineffectual in any
federal action.4" The court's use of the federal rules here, though valid in its
premise, seemingly invalidates the Louisiana statute without subjecting it to
constitutional scrutiny. The constitutionality of state foreign corporation laws
has been questioned." The vigorous dissent of Justice Jackson in Woods hinted
that the "harsh, capricious, and vindictive" 1 nature of such statutes bordered
on the unconstitutional." If the court chose Hanna in order to avoid determi-
nation of the constitutionality of such statutes, it did so artfully. Any constitu-
tional implications can now be avoided by using the approach of the court in
Avondale. Although the court considers the dictates of Hanna to afford relief to
corporations in such instances, it appears that use of Hanna in this area has
become a technique designed to forestall answering the constitutional questions
presented by state foreign corporation laws.
" 53 F.R.D. at 346.
47411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969).
4
"Id. at 127.
4 In light of the broad language of the Louisiana statute, one may question whether the
distinction between rule 17(b) and rule 13(a) situations drawn by some of the cases is
valid. See notes 39, 45, 48 supra, and accompanying text. Although the transparent purpose
of statutes such as these is to keep unregistered (and thus non-taxed) foreign corporations
out of the regulating state's courts, the court in Avondale construes this Louisiana statute as
a mere "housekeeping" rule. It is well settled that federal housekeeping rules prevail in fed-
eral courts. Since the Louisiana statute contains the broadest language possible, it is hard
to conceive of any state's statute which would not be so construed by a court taking this ap-
proach. The state policy is the same for either claim or counterclaim. The Avondale reason-
ing would, therefore, appear to require the same result for either rule 17 (b) or rule 13 (a).
SoSee Note, supra note 30.
-, 337 U.S. at 538, 539.
" A long line of Supreme Court decisions has held that a state statute must bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the evils it seeks to prevent. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945). If this evil is a corporate avoidance of state taxes, the denial of a state forum
as punishment seems inappropriate.
It has been convincingly argued that state foreign corporation laws place an unreasonable
and, thus, unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Walker, supra note 23, at 750-56.
The importance of discerning the state policy under the law in determining its burden on
interstate commerce is discussed in Note, Foreign Corporations: The Interrelation of Juris-
diction and Qualification, 33 IND. L.J. 358, 367 (1958).
[Vol. 26
